Part 1, of a 3 part series on COS, by SoonerPolitics and collaborative sources. |
May 23, 1979
MR. JOHN DALY: All right. Professor Scalia, Richard Rovere in the New Yorker, suggested that the convention method of amendment might;
- reinstate segregation
- and even slavery,
- throw out much or all of the Bill of Rights,
- eliminate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause,
- reverse any Supreme Court decision the members didn't like, and perhaps for good measure,
- eliminate the Supreme Court, itself. [Laughter.]
ANTONIN SCALIA, professor of law, University of Chicago: I suppose it might even pass a bill of attainder to hang Richard Rovere. [Laughter.] All those things are possible, I suppose, just as it is possible that the Congress tomorrow might pass a law abolishing social security as of the next day, or eliminating Christmas. Such things are possible, remotely possible. I have no fear that such extreme proposals would come out of a constitutional convention. Surely, whether that risk is sufficient to cause anyone to be opposed to a constitutional convention depends on how high we think the risk is and how necessary we think the convention is. If we thought the Congress were not necessary for any other purpose, the risk that it might abolish social security would probably be enough to tell its members to go home. So, it really comes down to whether we think a constitutional convention is necessary. I think it is necessary for some purposes, and I am willing to accept what seems to me a minimal risk of intemperate action. The founders inserted this alternative method of obtaining constitutional amendments because they knew the Congress would be unwilling to give attention to many issues the people are concerned with, particularly those involving restrictions on the federal government's own power. The founders foresaw that and they provided the convention as a remedy. If the only way to get that convention is to take this minimal risk, then it is a reasonable one. |
I have not proposed an open convention. Nobody in his right mind would propose it in preference to a convention limited to those provisions he wants changed . Regardless of the issue-say, a constitutional amendment on abortion-its supporters would want a convention that considers that issue and nothing else; or one that considers only the particular features of the Constitution that they do not like, but precludes consideration of those features they do like. I think there is nobody, except maybe one or two anarchists, who would sincerely want an open convention for its own sake, to expose the whole system to possible change. There comes a point, however, at which one has to be willing to run the risk of an open convention to get the changes that are wanted. Essentially what I have said is that there is some risk of an open convention, even with respect to the limited proposal of financial responsibility at the federal level. I think that risk is worth taking. It is not much of a risk. Three-quarters of the states would have to ratify whatever came out of the convention; therefore, I don't worry about it too much. I would also be willing to run that risk for issues primarily involving the structure of the federal government and a few other so-called single issues. I would favor a convention on abortion, which some consider a single issue. I suppose slavery could have been called a single issue, too. It all depends on how deeply one feels about the issue. In any case, I do not have any great fear of an open convention, since three-quarters of the states do have to ratify what comes out of it. The clucking that Richard Rovere and others do about it is simply an intentional attempt to create panic and to make the whole idea sound unthinkable. It is not unthinkable at all; it is entirely thinkable. | |
Antonin Scalia, 1979